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N THIS BOOK~ expl~re some of the.ways philanthropy contribut:s to morally
desirable relattonshtps when we gtve w1th care-w1th good wtll and good
judgment, with responsible moral concern. 1 In doing so I discuss a variety
of moral issues: the role of the virtues in philanthropy, responsibilities to
help others, distortions in helping, mixed motives in giving, and how voluntary
service contributes to self-fulfillment.
After providing an overview of the philosophy of philanthropy, Chapter
I develops a definition of philanthropy as voluntary private giving for public
purposes. This definition is value-neutral and draws together the enormous
variety of voluntary service for study without normative blinkers. It avoids
assumptions about whether philanthropy has good motives, aims, or results,
and it leaves open the question of whether philanthropy can be a moral responsibility. Sometimes philanthropy has a bad name; more often it has no
name at all or else the emotionally clouded name of "charity." While it is less
commonly used in everyday discourse than it was in the nineteenth century,
the word "philanthropy'' is currently undergoing a rebirth as a general term
referring to both volunteering and monetary giving, whether for humanitarian or cultural purposes. "Voluntary service" is a good two-word equivalent,
and I use it as a synonym, mindful that service comes in the form of money
as well as time.
Chapter I also develops a framework for connecting desirable forms of
philanthropy with the virtues. Most philanthropic giving occurs as participation in social practices, such as donating blood, contributing to public television, sheltering the homeless, paying tithing, and volunteering in museums
or hospitals. These are practices in the colloquial sense: patterns of conduct
engaged in by many people and continuing over time. They are also practices
in Alasdair Macintyre's technical sense: complex cooperative human endeavors which, when pursued virtuously, promote the good of individuals and

I
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Preface

communities. Philanthropy makes possible a variety of benefits to recipients
and benefactors, especially the caring relationships it fosters.
Philanthropy is not itself a virtue; it is an activity which may be good or
bad. Nor are any virtues unique to philanthropy. Instead, all major virtues
play a role in philanthropic giving: obviously generosity and compassion, but
also courage and conscientiousness, faith and fairness, gratitude and good
judgment, honesty and humility, integrity and inspiration, love and loyalty,
pride and perseverence, responsible authority and respect for others, selfknowledge and self-respect, wisdom and moral creativity. Chapter 2 discusses
some thirty virtues relevant to philanthropy, sorting them into two general
categories: participation virtues, which are especially important in motivating
philanthropy, and enabling virtues, which tend to make philanthropy effective. Elucidating these virtues with examples helps sharpen our moral understanding of philanthropy and philanthropists.
Much philanthropy is morally optional-desirable or at least permissible,
but not obligatory. In certain contexts there are also responsibilities to engage in philanthropy, as I argue in Chapter 3. Some of them derive from the
obligation of mutual aid in assisting people in life-threatening situations.
Others derive from the obligation of reciprocity to do our fair share in communities and practices from which we benefit. These two general obligations
apply to everyone, though their precise requirements vary greatly according
to circumstances. I also set forth a conception of "supererogatory responsibilities"-obligations transcending the call of duty incumbent on everyone, and
whose origin lies in highly personal commitments to optional moral ideals.
The responsibilities of professionals to engage in pro bono publico work (offering services at reduced or no fee) are often supererogatory but sometimes a
professional requirement. All philanthropic responsibilities, both general and
supererogatory ones, leave considerable room for discretion in deciding how
to meet them. Whether optional or obligatory, philanthropy is primarily a
forum for personal moral expression.
Philanthropy goes awry for many reasons besides bad luck. Attempts to
help are self-defeating when they are based upon naivete, stupidity, lack of
imagination, insensitivity, arrogance, or any number of other character flaws.
An especially egregious fault, one recurringly inveighed against in the history
of philanthropy, is the failure to respect individual autonomy, that is, the
right and the ability to competently pursue one's interests and values. In
Chapter 4- I discuss several instances involving degrading attitudes toward
recipients, abuses in fundraising, exploitation of volunteers, and harm to
third parties. In a related vein, I examine circumstances in which incentives
for volunteering are coercive, an issue that has surfaced in recent debates over
tying financial aid for college students to volunteering for national service.
Special attention is devoted to how sexism threatens the autonomy of women
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selfish or unsavory in other ways. And I argue agamst consequent1 1sm, t e
view that only results are morally important, not motives.
Philanthropy breeds paradoxes, several of which are discuss~d in. ~hapter
6. Thus it is said that selflessness promotes self-fulfillment; In g1vmg we
receive· 'we find ourselves by losing ourselves (in service to others); self-surrender '(to good causes) is liberating; the way to ge~ h~ppiness is t? forget it
(while promoting the happiness of other people); fatt.h 1s ~elf-~ulfillmg. The.se
conundrums are easily abused when they become rattonal1zat1o~s for expl~It
ing people on behalf of immoral causes. Yet. th~~ also conv~y Important msights as they apply to morally concerned mdiv1duals. Phllanthro~y offers
numerous avenues for self-fulfilling service, at least when a match ts found
between personal interests and philanthropic opportunities, and even though
altruism takes many other directions as well.
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Giving with Care
The epithets sociable, goo~-natured, humane, n:erciful, grateful, friendly~ generous,
beneficent, or their eqmvalents, are known m all languages, and umversally
express the highest merit, which human nature is capable of attaining.
-David Hume
When I give I give myself.
-Walt Whitman

"tX TE

philanthrorists on so~e occasi~ns. Each of us has conbeyond our ctrde of family and fnends and work. We have
donated money, time, talent, energy, blood, or clothing. We have volunteered
1:o help a community, church, political organization, social cause, sports team,
or scout troop. Put simply, philanthropy is voluntary giving for public ends.
More fully, philanthropy is voluntary private (nongovernment) giving for
public purposes, whether gifts are large or small, money or time, local or
international in scope, for purposes which are humanitarian, cultural, religious, civic, environmental, or of mutual aid. 1
At its best, philanthropy unites individuals in caring relationships that
enrich giver and receiver alike. Often it is heroic and inspiring: witness the
lives of Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, Susan B. Anthony, Jane Addams, Martin
Luther King, Jr., and Mother Teresa of Calcutta. But philanthropy can also
be harmful. 2 At its worst, it is divisive and demeaning to everyone involved,
as in contributing to hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. Too often philanthropy squanders precious resources on misguided groups such as those
promoting astrology and those more concerned with self-seeking than with
~elping others. In between the clearly good and the obviously bad, much
philanthropy is morally ambiguous, combining good intentions with bad results, or bad intentions with good results, or good and bad motives with
good and bad consequences.
Philanthropy, then, is morally complex, in theory as well as in practice.
While luck plays a role, much turns on whether we give with care-with
and carefulness, with good will and good judgment.
ARE ALL

. V V tributed
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Philosophy of Philanthropy
.Philanthropy raise~ importa?t moral issues in at least four main areas. (
Soctal and poht1cal philosophy 1s concerned with the overall impact of
lanthropy on society, as well as with the role of government in rPn•nl~... ; __..
and supporting it, for example with tax deductions for gifts to charities.
Professional ethics studies the responsibilities of development officers (
raisers), foundation officials, and other professionals involved in phu·ant:hr<)pi1~·•·•
organizations. (3) The ethics of recipients deals with the responsibilities
beneficiaries, such as honesty in writing grant proposals, fidelity to .nr-..-.~-.-'·
intentions, and avoiding harmful forms of dependency (pauperism). (4) The
ethics of philanthropic giving focuses on the ideals, virtues, and responsibilities of philanthropists.
In this book I focus on the ethics of philanthropic giving, only occasionally touching on the other areas. The topics discussed concern each
us as (actual or potential) donors and volunteers. Foundation and cor
tion philanthropy will be mentioned only as they bear on giving by indivi•
duals.
When ethicists have discussed philanthropy, typically under the name
charity, it has usually been in connection with particular topics such as giving to alleviate world hunger and volunteering to promote environmental
causes. Yet some issues require more systematic reflection. When and why ·
philanthropy valuable? How does it contribute to meaningful life? What does
it have to do with being a good person? In which ways does it promote
desirable communities? What should be our priorities in choosing which of
the innumerable good causes to support with our limited resources?
In addition to these general questions, or rather as my way of approaching them, I will ask six more focused questions, one in each of the chapters.
(I) How should philanthropy be defined and understood for the purposes
moral inquiry? (2) Which virtues guide giving? (3) Are there any responsibilities to engage in philanthropy, and if so, how much should we give and
to whom? (4) When is philanthropy morally damaging, and what does it
mean for gifts to be coerced or coercive? (5) Should philanthropy be motivated by pure altruism, that is, unselfish concern for others, or is it all right
for self-interest to be mixed with altruism? (6) How should we understand
the paradox that selflessness contributes to self-fulfillment?
These are large topics. They can be approached from many perspectives
and with the tools of many disciplines. While my research has been interdisciplinary, my framework is philosophical. I hope to show how philosophical
ethics increases our moral understanding of philanthropy and to encourage
others to do further work in this area.

3

:>.F~thllCIS1rs (moral philosophers, philosophers o~ mo~alit!) have. neglecte~
ilintl1fOPY~ largely relinquishing the toptc to soc1al sctenttsts. Philosophers
tltribtttt<>ns have tended to be written for technical journals which are ina wider audience, including a collection of essays which, remark3
th:o only contemporary philosophical book on philanthropy. Apart
that collection, most philosophical essays h~ve. been narrowly focused
s ecial topics as world hunger, thereby m1ss1ng the benefits of more
·.;>····~~tenlaiJLcp approaches. (Is it obvious, ~ithout a~gu~e~t, that world hunger
have priority over all other philanthropiC .g1vmg?) Others are . pre..,:1ttJtvw•... in the midst of developing an abstract ethtcal theory, more as lllustr<lltl<JUS than with an eye to practical implications.
This is a work in applied ethics, in three respects. First, the focus is on
topics arising in a particular area of our liv~s, rather than on ~eneral
in ethical theory. The topics are at once pubhc and personal, dehghtful
· ·· ..... ..,.-important and intriguing. They deserve to become an area
specialization in philosophy, alo~gside med_ical ethics, business ethics, ~n
tr:jnec:nlltg ethics, environmental eth1cs, and philosophy of women, to mentiOn
a few areas of applied philosophy which have emerged in recent decades.
Second, this book is a philosophical response to practical moral needs.
than dwelling on abstruse intellectual puzzles, the book is rooted in
J>tactJlCal interests. Nevertheless, those interests lead naturally into intellectuall'r cJlalllen:~mtg tasks: to clarify the moral concepts used as tools in making
philrultblrO]ptc decisions, to explore philanthropy's contribution to community
a.nd character, and to develop a unifying perspective on philanthropic values.
Third, because I am convinced that the lifeblood of philosophy is its
c.eontribution to public discourse, 4 I have written for a wide audience of stuinterdisciplinary scholars, social activists, and concerned citizens, as
as for professional philosophers. I have also tried to heed Moliere's coun5
"humanize your talk, and speak to be understood. "
My approach is applied, then, in terms of focus, relevance, and audience.
not, however, applied in the sense of embracing a general theory about
tound~ltto'n of moral values and applying it to philanthropy (or other
The three theories which have been most influential in recent cenhave attempted to state the foundational principles of right (and
action. Thus, according to Immanuel Kant's duty-ethics, right acts
required by a set of duties which would be embraced by fully ramoral agents. According to John Locke's rights-ethics, right acts are
which respect human rights. And according to utilitarians such as JeBentham and John Stuart Mill, right acts are those which produce the
good for the most people, or which fall under rules producing the most
· · ···"··· ···· ~-~--.-- .. good.
Why not select one of these theories and simply apply it to philanthropy?

1
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For one thing, it is not dear which theory to select. All the theories
in different versions, and all of them are highly controversial. Defending
one of them would immerse us in theoretical disputes, effectively susl>endin
applied inquiry. For another thing, these theories focus on rules about
and wrong action; they devote little attention to questions about higher
als of character and community which are crucial in thinking about
thropy.
Most important, we should be more impressed by the similarities
by the differences among the three theories. 6 Each theory is an
framework which can be filled out in many directions. Each emerged as
attempt to provide a clear and comprehensive overview of morality,
hence each must remain in line with our most carefully considered
convictions. Since defenders of all the theories struggle to make those
ments, it matters relatively little whether the final appeal is to duties or
or overall good. What matters is how principles of duties are formulated
weighed, how rights are understood, and how good consequences are
sured and tallied. To be sure, there are fundamental disagreements
reasonable people, even in the moral judgments they are most certain
Those differences, however, are reflected in different versions of each type
ethical theory, as well as in disputes over which type is preferable.
Accordingly, I draw freely upon ideas from all the theories, ackno,MedP'~
ing that the ideas will be developed in different ways within different
oretical frameworks. For example, I draw upon the concept of r ·
knowing that rights-ethicists will take them as morally fundamental,
ethicists will derive them from duties, and utilitarians will construe them
benefits and liberties whose recognition produces the most good for the
people. I also rely on principles that virtually all the theories endorse:
example, that we should do our fair share when we benefit from coc:>pt:rat:tVe
practices, and that we should help people whose lives are endangered
we can do so at little risk to ourselves.
One other ethical theory, virtue-ethics, will play a more prominent
Virtue-ethics emphasizes good and bad character more than principles
right and wrong conduct. This ancient theory, which has attracted rentewea
interest during the past decade, has sometimes been viewed as an .................... "~"'
to theories about right and wrong conduct. That is a mistake. Good . .
L-·.
and right conduct are complementary ideas, not competing ones.
quate ethical theory will integrate them rather than attempt to derive
from the other. Hence I am not claiming that virtue-ethics is a sufficient
theory of morality, or that virtues are more theoretically fundamental
right action. 7 As an applied ethicist, my interest is in exploring specific virtues and other aspects of character which contribute to understanding phi,;
lanthropy. I explore good character in all its dimensions: responsible '-v••'"'"''""L'·
u ...........

5

central thesis, or rather theme, is that virtuous philanthropy fosters
philanthr?p~ i~ a vital dimension. of
.,...• /.
m.n ..
good lives. Not all good lives, h~weve~, for l?divlduals may _emphastze
•.•. •.. ·.. •••"t-::L'"""~- avenues for caring, such as famlly, fnendsh1p, and professions. I am
claiming that philanthropy is the primary mark of all caring people, but
that virtuous philanthropy adds meaning to the lives of morally con•·c·•··•··''''"""''.....,...-~ individuals. Philosophical inquiry should help make that contribution

~?'~

<r ~Yilluable caring relationships. As a result,
T

begins in wonder (Aristotle) and love (Plato), develops by
<><•.¢Qrttr<>ntmg perplexity (Wittgenstein), and culminates by enhancing mean.(,;;>Jp.gf1Il life (Socrates). To study ethics is to scrutinize our own moral values,
.·~·1rtp~hil:anthr<>PV as elsewhere. Such is the heritage of Socrates, that remarkable
iilanthtrOIJist who engaged in philosophy as a voluntary service to his comas well as a search for self-understanding.
'" '".... ·. 1-'hllO:sot>hv integrates personal vision and public argument. Like science,
..~'c''"'''··"" ~"''"'.....,., truth; like art, it seeks to convey an individual perspective which
·"~
contact with interpersonal values. As Wittgenstein aptly suggested,
''.\t?tulosOl>hv is much like architecture. 8 In both disciplines, structures stand or
.tall. J:>1ecause of realities independent of us. In both, much of the work is done
,:y"l'·""ll\...~1;;11~ on one's interpretation of the world, on one's way of seeing and
., ............,...wu

overall tone of this book is positive. In part that is because my
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primary interest is in how philanthropy contributes to valuable caring
tionships. In part it reflects my conviction that philanthropy evokes
our noblest impulses and does far more good than bad. Nevertheless,
rather because of this positive tone, three caveats are necessary.
First, my faith that philanthropy does far more good than bad is
that-a faith. Defending it would require a different kind of book. 9 In
book the focus is on the practical moral interests of individual givers.
fending claims about the overall effects of philanthropy would require a
that moved away from personal ethics and toward social and political
sophy centered on nonprofit organizations, foundations, governments,
the cumulative impact of philanthropy on society. For the purposes of
book, what matters is that much good is done through philanthropy, and
is not so much a faith as it is common knowledge.
The social-political approach would ask, for example: Are social
best provided by the federal government, state governments, nonprofit
nizations, or some combination thereof? Should the arts and humanities
heavily subsidized by tax revenues or left to philanthropic patronage? To
extent should government regulate the activities of philanthropic nrn............ ~
tions? Which gifts ought to be tax deductible? How should pnJtiarlthJ:'OPl
organizations be structured and managed? Do predominant patterns of
lanthropy in the United States benefit the rich more than the poor,
more than women, the arts more than malnourished children? My
virtuous giving complements, but cannot replace, inquiry into these
tions.
Second, I am not writing as an apologist for the Nonprofit Sector. It
become fashionable, if not altogether illuminating, to divide the
economy into three sectors: business (for-profit companies), government,
nonprofits (not-for-profit organizations). The Nonprofit Sector is so ·
that general perceptions of it are much like responses to Rorschach tests:
reveal more about the perceiver than what is perceived. Virtue and vice,
well as altruistic service and corruption, are manifested in all ec<Jm>mJ
areas-government, business, the professions, family, and philanthropy.
much that I say implies the vital significance of a vigorous Nonprofit
Third, and most important, I am not endorsing a political ideology
favors private philanthropy as a replacement for government welfare
grams. Government bears the primary responsibility for meeting the
needs of disadvantaged citizens by fairly distributing welfare costs
taxation. 10 There are four reasons for this.
(1) Scale. Homelessness, violence, and poverty (especially of ..... u.~.~...~...
have increased dramatically during the past decade. During the same
welfare services have been cut back. Support for disadvantaged people is
delivered through a partnership among government, nonprofit or~~an1'2~anons
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but primary responsibility for funding for the desper-
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.
·
· 1
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Fairness. Government provides a mechanism for .fairly distnhbut~ng
i.bttrac:::ns on taxpayers and benefits for recipients. While that mec antsm
.t·~llwa·vs used properly, nevertheless it tends to be more reliable than the
fforts of philanthropic organizations, even when those efforts be(as they usually are not). Concentrating on the weaknesses
e
vel~nrne
t
and
the moral limitations of a competitive marketplace should
11
1
12
in the hyperbole of calling philanthropy "the moral sector."
Symbolism. Government prog~ams express t,?e collec~ive ca~i?g of an
society, symbolically as well.as m substance .. An_ o~fictal pohtiCal c?nissues or problems," wntes Robert Noztck, 1s a way of markmg
ir}i mnort:am:e or urgency, and hence of expressing, intensifying, channelencouraging, and validating our private actions and concerns toward
'?13. Government programs are essential to establish the "solemn markour human solidarity'' within caring communities.
course, philanthropy also carries symbolic meanings, as I will_em~ha
··· '""'·"L often, however, its symbolism does not express the offiCial v1ew
-.. . ~~···-.. society. That is both a limit and a strength. Philanthropy enables
<t,,,............ and groups to express their values, substantively and symbolically,
first having to persuade the majority in a democracy. That frees phito function as a catalyst for change. It makes possible focused and
responses to social problems and community aspirations, sometimes
r¢f<::>tnung government. Above all, it contributes to caring relationships
1<¢1Dmmutm1:tes in more personal ways than by voting and paying taxes.
1

Scope of Philanthropy
children, my friends and I gave to the March of Dimes thro}lgh our
troup. We saved dimes in cardboard holders and then mailed them in
We also sponsored fundraisers, staffed carnival booths, and served
•mlnumt:v dinners. Helping was a simple gesture, at once a natural impulse,
and a group endeavor. It was clear to us there were other avenues
net·ptng. Family and friends supported victims of polio in a more exten-
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si:e and in~imate. way, an~ scientists such as Jonas Salk helped through
attve. w?rk 1.n their pro~e~s.tons. 14 I do not remember, however, using a
to disttngmsh our acttVItles from these other forms of service; we
lumped them all together under the heading of helping out or doing
share. Today the best single term is "philanthropy"; the best two-word
pression is "voluntary service." I use them interchangeably, with some
erence for the brevity of the former, to refer to all forms of voluntary
giving for public purposes.
Alternative terms are misleading for one reason or another. Thus
word "humanitarianism" is either too broad in covering all kinds of "
including work in the professions, or too narrow in referring to the
tion of suffering but not to cultural patronage. "Charity'' may be
by some people, but its meaning has become diffused into three spe:ctaJlt~
m~ani~gs: Christian love (in its honorific sense), condescending pity ( ·
peJorative sense), and the tax-deductible status of organizations (in its
sense). "Volunt~rism" .and "volunteerism" suggest a particular ideology
how to deal wtth soctal problems, namely, through voluntary service
than by government involvement.
The definition of philanthropy is somewhat vague. Each of its four
terc~nnected elements needs to be clarified: voluntary, private, giving,
pubhc purposes. It would be futile, however, to seek an absolutely
definition. "Philanthropy'' refers to many kinds of giving which are
related by overlapping similarities. 15 The following remarks are ·u·tter1de1d'
s~g?posts which roughly indicate the ground to be explored without
ngtd ~onceptual boundaries. Or rather, the remarks identify the features
paradigm (dear-cut) cases while also indicating areas of vagueness which
my purposes need not be removed.
(I) Philanthropy is voluntary in the sense of being intended and
~reed. "~ntended" means the act or activity is done with the purpose of
tng a gtft. "Uncoerced" rules out legal penalties for not giving, as well
threats of harm and other morally objectionable forms of force, mant·lm1:1t1o
and deception. Extortion, not philanthropy, occurs when a donation is
?ecause o~ a threat of penalties, and abusive force is present when a
Is constramed to make a political contribution in order to keep a job.
. V~luntarin~s.s implies both the absence of coercion and the presence
mtentt~nal acttvtty. When one of these elements is missing, nonstandard
borderline (doubtful) cases arise. Suppose I am deceived or otherwise
into giving money for a purpose I disapprove of. Perhaps a "charity
teer'' cons me into believing I am giving in order to help build a shelter
homeless ~eopl~ and then uses my money to support his lavish lifestyle.
I engage 1n philanthropy? Yes and no. Yes: I acted intentionally for
thought was a public purpose, even though my intention was subverted.
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was manipulated and coerced, even though I attempted to engage
. Whatever we decide to say about such cases, they are not
hat would be used in explaining what philanthropy is.
t
is not a synonym for "willingly," in the sense of acting as
r wishes to. Loyal citizens concerned with the public good might
~xes willingly, without feeling pressured to give. Nevertheless,
not a form of voluntary service. The failure to pay them carries a
and hence there is force present, even if some individuals do
for~ed. Conversely, some philanthropy is done reluctantly, rather
.,<JII1nc:l'tv Individuals might voluntarily contribute to Amnesty Interna·'M•-->t-1'r~te·o by a stern sense of duty, all the time wishing they could
money in more self-indulgent ways. Perhaps the reluctance indiabsence of perfect virtue, but it does not make the giving involun"voluntary'' does not mean morally optional or nonobligis important. Our definition allows that some philanthropy might
responsibility, as many people believe it is. I might give volunIrttentionally and without coercion, to help people in serious distress,
believing I have a responsibility to give. My belief, in turn, may be
depetldlng on the circumstances and on justifiable principles of obligageneral, issues concerning obligations should be left open for inquiry
dosed by definitional fiat.
foblht:an'ne:ss is a matter of degree and interpretation, as is coercion.
is obvious when criminals are ordered to engage in community
as the penalty for their crime. A lesser degree of coercion occurs when
given a choice between community service and spending time in
should we say, however, about Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's
"'>h•..,...... " of community service in working with inner-city youths? The
was not entirely voluntary, since it was court-ordered as part of the
for his conviction in the Iran-Contra scandal (a conviction that was
· o\rertunled). Nevertheless, he approached his service with an enthusias"attacking this public service with the energy and tenacity of a born
He developed innovative ideas, initiating a "Pied Piper Program"
children away from drugs by taking them to observe cocaine addicts.
punching a dock, he put in longer hours and far more effort
required. While his service is not a paradigm of philanthropy, surely
a philanthropic dimension.
:~o>rne:tJ.lmt~s we make donations because we are pressured by fundraisers,
friends, religious leaders, or a climate of social expectation. Are
pressures coercive, making giving more like extortion than voluntary
? ·Occasionally, peer pressure can become extreme so as to generate
of coercion, and pressures within authority relationships easily be-
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come coercive, as with pressures to contribute to an employer's favorite
However, most social pressures to give are moderate, of the kind
in human affairs. We are free to resist them without penalty, other
negative attitudes of others-which we must confront in all areas of
(2) Private giving contrasts with government spending. P _____ _. ....... v
give their own money and time, unlike government officials who
public money. Most philanthropic giving, about 8o percent of it,
gifts by individuals. The rest comes from nongovernment oq~anliZ<lttions.c
pecially private foundations, not-for-profit corporations, and for-profit
nesses.
In practice, philanthropy and government spending are u·....... ,......__ _
Many nonprofit philanthropic organizations are funded as much by
ment funds as by private support. America's welfare programs
much on nonprofit organizations as on government agencies to
vices. The extent of this dependence became clear during Ronald
administration. Reagan praised nonprofit welfare organizations while
cutting government funding for them. He also reduced tax incenti
individual gifts to charities. 17 The result was a sharp curtailment of
serviCes.
It is tempting to refer to federal humanitarian aid to other ron., ..... ,........
"government philanthropy." I will resist the temptation. It is true that
foreign aid amounts to indirect giving from the citizens of aeJmC)Cr:ilcu~s
the citizens of other countries. The government serves as a vehicle for
rying out the humanitarian aims of its citizens, as well as the aims of
expediency, presumably based on their collective consent to be taxed for
purposes. Yet much the same can be said of government spending on
programs for its citizens. Even when voluntary giving and taxation
the same ends, then, it is worthwhile to distinguish them by rt>~:t"r'LJ1n,o
term "philanthropy'' for nongovernment giving.
(3) Giving means donating one's resources without contracting to
comparable economic compensation. The resources may take the form of
unteered labor, expertise, money, or items having economic value. Gi
differs from economic exchanges, such as selling a car, where there is
explicit contract between two parties who exchange goods or services.
theless, sometimes philanthropy is engaged in to acquire economic
as with most corporate philanthropy, which is tied to marketing and
relations.
Philanthropists often do seek economic benefits. Volunteers might
and need advertised benefits, such as the modest living stipend given to
Corps volunteers. Occasionally they even receive indirect economic
greater than their contributions, for example, lucrative employment
nities based on their credentials as volunteers, or business advantages
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for community involvement. Since ~ want t? leave ope?
motives, I will allow that self-interest 1s sometimes the pnclusive motive for philanthropy.
exHood a philanthropist? Acco~ding to legen~, he libe~ally disto needy people without seekmg compensatton, motivated by
a sense of justice. 18 Yet the money was stolen, hence not hts
· ·t let us agree that giving means transferring ownership of
1 y,
or can
.
, .
d al
19 A
sproperty, as well as volunteen~g o?e s ume an t ent.
Hood was returning money to tts nghtful owners because the
ere so excessive as to be immoral, Robin Hood qualifies as a
w for his voluntary service on behalf of a public cause. Philannot occur, however, when one donates to a charity money
.;rnmu.u.l\..Ht..J. • Presumably that was involved in the charitable gifts of
f dollars by Michael Milken, the junk-bond financier of corporate
0
during the 19sos who was sent to jail on numerous counts of fraud.
foundation officers who distribute grants philanthropists? Probably
· they are paid professionals and assuming they do not own the
. Yet suppose a particular officer chooses the job over far more
offers, pursues the work from a desire to help others, ~~d p_uts in
time and effort than is normally expected? Our defimuon 1s sufflexible to acknowledge a philanthropic dimension to this work.
is also a philanthropic dimension to workers who serve the public
the compensation of a paycheck. For most jobs we can distinguish
(a) the required level of performance and (b) an exceptional (optimaJdmal) level of performance. 20 When workers perform at exceptional
order to help others well beyond what they are paid for, their work
a philanthropic dimension. For example, consider Wally Olson, the
singing bus driver who leads his passengers in songs, each day
requests for favorite numbers. 21 He gets to know his regular cusand becomes involved with their problems. And he makes it his job
a cheerful, caring attitude that has helped to personalize an othimpersonal and occasionally violent work situation.
Public purposes comprise virtually all social aims beyond helping one's
and friends. The aims might be civic: citizens' support for cities, connnations, political candidates and groups, and social movements.
r"u.ull:,.11L be religious: support for a church, synagogue, mosque, or reliSome are cultural: gifts for the arts, humanities, science,
libraries, or historical monuments. Others are humanitarian: giv9 c~m<:rg~enc:v relief efforts, donating blood, contributing to medical revolunteering in a center for the disabled, or finding shelter for the
Still others are environmental: protecting animals, forests, ecosysand clean air and water.
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Philanthropy and friendship overlap in many instances. Is Dflill::tru-t,;•.
involved when individuals donate to a literary dub or church whose
are their friends? Yes, because the group is open to future mc:::mtJer,
becau~e. there is a ~ublic purpose beyond friendship, namely, literary
or rehg10us worship. Even if donors' motives are largely self-u·ue1res1ted
organization may benefit other people and in that sense qualify as a
purpose.
!he e~pression "public purpose" is ambiguous in a helpful way. It
to either (1) the purposes of givers, that is, their intentions and aims
the ends actually promoted by gifts. Thus, philanthropy may occu~
d~nors try to promote what they believe to be a public good, even ·
fad to produce the intended results. Philanthropy also occurs when
successfully promote a public purpose, even though their primary ·
were for other things, such as gaining personal recognition.
To sum up, the definition of philanthropy as voluntary private
public purposes contains several areas of vagueness. Nevertheless, it
eral dear benefits for exploring the ethics of philanthropy. It avoids
in preconceptions about good motives, admirable aims, desirable co11se1a1
ces, and whether philanthropy can be a moral responsibility. All these
ters are left for moral inquiry. Hence the definition is value-neutral
"persuasive definitions" which build in controversial attitudes or
'
22
about philanthropy.
Persuasive definitions of philanthropy abound, sometimes P01tnttn1
opposing directions. Here are eight persuasive definitions, each of
some basis in ordinary language and may be useful in other contexts.
they bias rather than facilitate moral inquiry, I note them in order
them aside.
(1) Lavish, large-scale giving, whether by very rich individuals
foundations? 3 (Philanthropy versus small gifts.) -This definition aids
abets the stereotype of philanthropy as the proper domain of the
Yet, about half the total dollar amounts of voluntary private giving for
pu~poses comes from lower- and middle-income people. 24 Refusing to
philanthropy as the province of the upper class is a first move toward
ciating how it permeates all social classes.
(2) Giving motivated by humanitarian love. (Philanthropy versus
from nonhumanitarian motives.) -This definition has its roots in
ogy: philanthropia is the Greek word for "love of humanity," altholllgtt.c:
the Greeks "humanity'' meant free citizens and ruled out women
barbarians. Nevertheless, the definition is misleading in several 'res:oe~cts.
~uilds in one motive for philanthropy rather than leave the question
ttves open for moral inquiry. Moreover, the motive suggests universal
cern for humans, whereas much voluntary giving has more
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as to help artists or scientists, Mormons or Baptists, local
or nations, or to honor a famil~ name or a dec.eased relative.
also disregards philanthropy a1med at preventmg cruelty to
animals.
.
.
. .
optional giving. 25 . (Philanthropy ~ersus ~b.hgatory giVtng.)
, it might be said 1n defense of thts definttton, ought to be
f ·0y and generosity, not onerous duty. Yet many people engage
Jservice motivated by a sense of responsibility, and that seems
omtoa:ttllle with joyous giving. Surely these individuals are not conless morally flawed. In any case, rather than separate obligation
~-ta~mthrc>DV at the outset, we should leave open for inquiry whether
is sometimes morally required.
...,. · -- for cultural purposes, such as the arts and sciences, rather
giving to alleviate. suffering.~6 (Philanthropy as cultu~al par~ ,,rcr:>u:> compassionate chanty.) - Thts usage creates another mtslead:.;.,...,,...."'~n. Giving to science and education is sometimes motivated by
to alleviate suffering by discovering long-term solutions to disease
.lU"-·"J.UJ;:.· Most important, for the purposes of moral inquiry we need a
that brings together cultural patronage and relief of suffering in
invite questions about their relative priority.
· · to prevent suffering by discovering long-term solutions, rather
27
........... 9"..,... .,., alleviation of suffering.
(Philanthropy as prevention versus
-This definition seems to embody an attitude about the desirable
in giving. Yet surely both short-term and long-term solutions to
are important. Questions about relative priorities in allocating our
should be left for investigation into particular situations rather than
the outset by a definition.
Giving money, rather than volunteering time and talent. (Philanversus volunteering.) -In fact, volunteered time and talent usually
economic value, and offering money is one way to volunteer help.
why I will use "philanthropy'' and "voluntary service" as rough synwhile using "volunteering'' with its normal connotation of service
hands-on participation. 28
Good giving; giving which is wisely conceived, admirably motivated,
>tneflc:ial in its consequences. ("True philanthropy'' versus flawed givhonorific usage has a place in inspirational writings and at cerpr~ising benefactors, but it is not useful in identifying an area of
The nonprofit (independent, third) sector. 29 (Philanthropy versus
and business.) -It is true that much voluntary giving for public
is directed toward such nonprofit organizations as museums, private
churches, and shelters for battered women. Nevertheless, it is mis-
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leading to use the word "philanthropy'' to refer to the not-for-profit
Some nonprofit organizations have no connection with voluntary
some are established for tax purposes or other economic purposes
than for serving public purposes. Conversely, many profit-making '
tions (such as for-profit hospitals) and government organizations
public schools and libraries) depend heavily on volunteers and private
tions. Philanthropy functions in all economic sectors.

Practices and Virtues
I defined philanthropy as acts of voluntary private giving for public
poses. 30 These acts, however, are rarely eccentric gestures; usually they
in the course of participating in social practices. Here are just a few
of philanthropic practices: giving by alumni to their alma maters,
blood, sheltering the homeless, contributing to public radio and
patronage of the arts, volunteering in community organizations
hospitals, museums, police programs), participating in service groups
wanis Club, Rotary Club, some sororities and fraternities), serving in
munity safety programs, taking part in social protest movements, · ·
watchdog group to improve government, paying tithing, going on a
assisting in wildlife preservation, whistle-blowing to warn the public of
gers.
These are social practices in the colloquial sense: patterns of
engaged in by many people and continuing over time. They are also
in Alasdair Macintyre's technical sense: activities that contribute to
good when participants meet appropriate standards of excellence. 31
thropy encompasses a large cluster of related practices, in the same
the professions (medicine, teaching, engineering), sports (basketball,
tennis), sciences (biology, physics, sociology), and the fine arts (
painting, sculpture, music), to cite some of Macintyre's examples of
More fully, a practice is
[I] any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
man activity [2] through which goods internal to that form of
realized [3] in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of
[+] with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically ext,enCJLea;·
I will clarify this definition as I apply each of its four parts to
U'~'"
(I) Practices, including philanthropic practices, are "socially est::tbllSll
in that they are made possible by structured societies and sustained by
traditions. Practices remain coherent and identifiable even when they
vuJLJ.<U ...
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'i"tliiffe:retlt forms over time and across cultures. Think of the varic. .
lassical Athens to today's professional athletics, or the
trom c
h
h
b
. h.
during the same time span. ~ .e.re .ave een as~oms 1ng
m the techniques and
als and functions of these actlvttles,
go
·
h
· t he soc1"al
l'*rnblctvelo.. in the organizations promotmg t em, and tn
e Philanthropy has an equally rich history of varied
ser¥ .
. . . al
.
purposes, styles, tactics, and tnstltutlon structunng.
foundations have become essential to contemporary philandid not exist a few centuries ago. By contrast, settlement
t hey
.
·
h
e vitally important urban communtty centers pnor to t e
~
b
di
of government programs, but they h~ve al~ ut sappeared .
practice of donating blood became posstbledi~tth the emergifien~ale
m erucat technology, and someday 1t may sappear as art c1
are developed. And there are both striking similarities and
· medieval church-controlled charity (in the religious sense) and
m
. 1
ove:rmme1at-1regulatea charity (in the legal sense). Increastng y, conv o~hilan1throptc practices are framed by a complex and ever-changing
laws concerning tax deductions, rules for political donations,
requirements for nonprofit corporations, and professional
of development officers.
·""''"'1!-i .............., is a "cooperative human activity'' in several respects. To
it requires the active involvement of both givers and receivers.
philanthropy is impossib~e if n~ on~ is willi~g t~ ~ffer help or
calls for aid; it is equally tmposstble 1f no one IS wtllmg to accept
there is more to be said. It is a misleading stereotype to regard
as passive. Often they assert their needs and invite the ~articipat~on
and donors. Think, for example, of a person seek1ng funding
·puJn<l~ttJ.Lon by writing a grant proposal. Think, too, of a group vigto get a member of a minority elected as a volunteer member
il'rnnn1t-\T board .
.~_.,........,,....,......~givers and receivers are usually members of groups whose
depends on cooperation. Donors might belong to organizations
clubs, companies, or schools. Alternatively, they may be idena group only by reference to their philanthropic goal: for example,
to relief services for victims of the 1988 Armenia earthquake.
large numbers of benefactors may be required in order to marshal
re:souLrC(~S for tackling social problems. Beneficiaries, too, are typiof groups: residents of a country served by a privately funded
l) t\.:m,en·carts in need of a kidney transplant, starving people in Bang1

intermediary groups and institutions play important roles in
givers and receivers. Many of these organizations have complex
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internal structures which enable them to exert social influence.
nizations facilitate the activity of donors by collecting gifts and
them to beneficiaries. Others aid recipients, such as universities and
nity advisory groups which help grant writers to solicit rotlnctatllort
Still others serve both constituencies, gathering and then n'"'"""'"n.-.~
for example, the United Way, CARE, Amnesty International,
the Arts, Black United Fund, and various churches and syr1ag;ogue~•.•
Finally, shifting to a value judgment, philanthropy tends to
when it is a two-way interaction between donors and recipients
each other as moral equals, rather than a one-way abandoning of
from the rich to the poor. 33 The more both parties actively
what is viewed as a shared enterprise, the more both benefit from
exchanges and relationships.
(2) The "internal goods" of a practice are those desirable
moted by the practice in some singular (if not unique) manner
defines the practice itself. 34 They include worthwhile experiences
tionships, the exercise of valuable skills, and useful products and
ated by practices. For example, each profession promotes
services: medicine promotes health, law protects rights and serves
education promotes learning, and engineering creates useful
products. The fine arts promote several internal goods: artistic
aesthetic enjoyment, and the creation of cultural artifacts and "".,,.....,....,,.~
Given their enormous diversity, philanthropic practices pr<>m•ote.,a
variety of internal goods. They range from alleviating poverty to
injured animals, from serving religious needs to improving gover~nrnetlt
increasing literacy to promoting the arts. In general, philanthropic
promote internal goods in numerous ways.
Many philanthropic practices directly serve basic needs. Uttenmt
to the homeless, a practice important in nearly all societies, contn
survival needs, whether the shelter is temporary or permanent as in
for Humanity's program of building homes. Working in a soup
tains people who would otherwise be without food. Serving in a
security program promotes public safety. And animal rescue and
tion programs respond to the needs of nonhuman animals.
Philanthropic practices may function as indirect or second-order
promote the internal goods of another, primary practice. For
alumni giving promotes learning, which is also the internal good
tion. Again, patronage of the arts furthers the same internal
arts themselves. And philanthropic contributions to improve
promote justice, and serve the public welfare share these internal
professionals working in government.
Sometimes philanthropic practices are embedded in other,
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directly promote their internal goods. Tithing, for example,
part of some religions; it is both a religious and a philanWhen lawyers engage in pro bono publico work, volunteering
ithout fee or at reduced fees, they are simultaneously engaged
w law and philanthropy. And unpaid sheriff's deputies in ponn>er·arrts are engaged in both voluntary service and law enforceand most important for my purposes, philanthropy promotes gegoods of its own, distinct from those of a primary practice to
be attached-generic in that they can be achieved through virof philanthropy. In particular, successful philant~ro.py creates
caring relationships between benefactors and benefioanes. These
morally benefit giver and receiver alike, in ways I will explore
this book. Philanthropy also fosters caring relationships among
work together as donors or volunteers. And it can promote caring
among recipients who share resources used for public endeavors,
among members of a literacy education group which is supfoundation grant.
contrasts internal goods with "external goods"-such as inand fame-which do not define the practice and which can
by engaging in many different social practices. Individuals parin professions typically have some interest in both external and
. They seek money and professional recognition (external
well as the specific form of excellence or craftsmanship involved
JJ.'-''"."''... (an internal good). The same is true of organizations conpractices, such as those serving the professions (for example, the
Association of University Professors), the sciences (the American
Science), or the arts (the Actors Guild). Institutions also have
rit Jtnt1erests in external, as well as internal, goods: ''They are involved
money and other material goods; they are structured in terms
status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards.
they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but
· of which they are the bearers. For no practices can survive
of time unsustained by institutions. " 35
the same is true in philanthropy. Philanthropic organizations are
interested in their own survival, growth, resources, and reputato meet their philanthropic aims. Individuals, too, are typically
in self-esteem, recognition and appreciation, and personal develop. · to their commitment to some public good. Within limits,
mixture of purposes is morally acceptable, even desirable, inso:trengt:heJils the overall pursuit of good ends (as is argued in Chapter
those limits, excessive concern for external goods, such as power
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and prestige, distorts commitments to the internal goods of ..,........ ,,,rn
ways that cause harm (of the kind discussed in Chapter 4).
(3) "Standards of excellence" define better and worse ways of
in a practice and thereby partly define the practice itself. The
achievement in baseball, for example, define excellence in batting,
and stealing bases, and partly define the nature and goals of the
ilarly, philanthropic standards of excellence specify what it means
well, and thereby partly define philanthropic practices. They
help effectively, without waste and without making recipients feel
They comprise all the norms, guidelines, virtues, and ideals that
helping and caring relationships in philanthropy.
(4) As numerous individuals and groups pursue excellence in
"human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of
and goods involved, are systematically extended." Talented
example, have extended conceptions of technological possibilities as
veloped automobiles, computers, space shuttles. Similarly, creative
pists have widened the possibilities for caring within communities,
for achieving an array of other public goods. To a remarkable
history of philanthropy is the history of social innovation. 36
nents of modern contemporary society began as philanthropic
public education, community hospitals and libraries, welfare
civil rights legislation, to name only a few.
Now that Macintyre's definition of practices has been applied to
thropy, consider an objection. I have suggested that philanthropy,·
a set of social practices in a normative or value-laden sense which ·
the ideas of internal goods and standards of excellence. Yet I
value-neutral definition of philanthropy as voluntary private giving
purposes. Is this a contradiction, such that philanthropy is ree:arcted
neutral and normative terms?
In reply, we need to mark two distinctions. One is the d.1tJtere:111
tween defining a concept and developing a normative conception of
to which the concept applies. Defining how to operate a car is
presenting a conception of safe driving is another. Similarly,
anthropic acts is one thing; conceiving of them as parts of goodpractices is another. The definition of philanthropy remains value-net
that it makes no assumptions about when philanthropy is good or
contrast, the conception of philanthropic practices is normative in
trays much philanthropy as aimed at internal goods.
I am not claiming that all philanthropic activities are practices
Intyre's sense. Racist and violent activities which assault the public
not social practices, with internal goods. If racists and terrorists
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how they are mistaken. Moreover, defining practices
are good on balance. A phil. ht serve an internal good and yet also promote undemtg a religious mtsston
· · 1s
· a value-1aden practice
· m
· t h at
'''~"''t'Ullfltl 0 n
. h
to,waru some aspect of the public ~o?d, but we mig t see more
. particular forms of proselyttzmg.
dis~nction is between individual acts and the general practices
definition of philanthropy focused on acts, whereas the
''""~,........,.u-.n applies to philanthropic practices as a whole. We can
as falling under a practi~e wi~hout evaluating t~e act. To use
from medicine, we can. Identtfy a_ heart operat1?n as a phyoccurs within a practtce whose mternal good 1s health, and
t immoral because its ineptness killed the patient. Similarly,
acacts as falling under philanthropic practices without implying
We can say, for example, that giving cash to a mendicant
practice of alms giving, whose internal good is to meet basic
;ad·vai1tta~~ea individuals. At the same time, we can criticize the
001,0 pna1te if it is likely to be used for drugs and where a more
would have been a donation to a hunger organization which
money's proper use.
lirur1ltllOn of philanthropy, then, remains value-neutral even though
Ml:>et:!:tmmnt,g to develop a normative conception of desirable forms
The next step is to extend that conception by relating philot~tcttces to the virtues.
imply desirable patterns of action, but also much more. Most of
valuable patterns of emotions, attitudes, desires, utterances, rearelationships. For example, kindness is sensitive concern for the
of others as manifested in actions, words, reasoning, and feelings.
is shown by avoiding cheating and stealing, motivated by
... , ..... L..,.,.......• it is also shown by having respect for truth and evidence,
shoddy thinking, and pride in communicating clearly. Virtues
merit badges. They are valuable ways of relating to people,
communities. As such, they promote the good of both ourothers.
identifies three ways in which the virtues promote internal
they enable participants in practices to meet appropriate stanex~::ellen<:e so as to achieve internal goods. Macintyre makes this
of the definition of virtues: "a virtue is an acquired human qual)SS~:ssi'on and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those
are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively preachieving any such goods."37 Standards of excellence differ

n~~ :mply that all practices
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greatly among practices, which is not surprising since they partly
dividual practices, but the virtues are important in all practices,
somewhat different ways depending on the context. Such virtues
and respect for people, for example, promote excellence in pr<)te:ss1c
enting, playing sports-and philanthropy.
Some virtues motivate people to participate in philanthropy; for
compassionateness, generosity, loyalty, and a sense of justice.
enable us to give effectively. Prudence and practical wisdom help
wasting resources by inquiring carefully into which organizations
of support. Kindness and humility enable us to avoid snobbery
scending pity toward recipients. Courage and persistence are vital
for volunteers seeking social reform. Honesty and integrity enable
to preserve public trust in organizations. And justice and tat'rnc~ss,
corruption in organizations. As these examples suggest, the
the virtues in philanthropy reflects the complexity of moral life.
Second, the virtues foster unity of character. Conflict and
permeate our lives. Some conflicts derive from threats to those
commitments which provide personal continuity and integrity.
of self-discipline and self-knowledge enable us to confront ternpt:afi4
weakness; courage enables us to meet danger; perseverence helps
with discouragement. Other conflicts derive from tensions within
commitments. The virtues promote balance and integration among
ious practices and relationships we commit ourselves to at any ·
For example, prudence and conscientiousness help us manage the
demands of family, friends, education, work, political involvement,
anthropic commitments. In general, the virtues provide guidance
ence in the ongoing "narrative quest'' (endeavor over time) to ·
to live well. 38
Third, the virtues sustain moral traditions and communities. 39
tradition is a valuable way of living which maintains an identifiable
through time. Traditions are embedded in communities, including
nities unified by geography, history, economics, religion, and ·
common practices. By permeating communities, virtues sustain
through many generations.
Each of these roles for the virtues is important in un.derstan(:ll,.l
moral status of philanthropy. Chapter 3 explores how virtues
lence in philanthropic practices. Chapter 6 explores how the
personal unity during the ongoing search for a fulfilling life. "-'U....., ..,.,..
cusses the harms done to individuals and communities in the
important virtues. And the following section in this chapter says
the role of the virtues in sustaining communities. Before Dr<)ceedl.ng;
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ditional ways in which the virtues enter into
note some ad
.
the three Macintyre discu~ses. .
.
.
·
rtues
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functiOn
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tdeals
for
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kmd
of
mrole of t he vt
'al 'd al
· to become · Each virtue represents
a partt 1 e.
. .
asptre
S Of virtues define composite tdeals. A composite
1
c~=
.
· ht be honesty and commitment to excellence combmed
rrug others. In this way, ideals of v1rtue
·
f unction
· as gu1'des
toward
commitments, and habit formation, even when they are not
·
guide moral education. Of course,
vtrtues
, we also use simple
in teaching morality: Be hones~, Don t steal, Retur~ favors
the point of citing these rules 1s largely to convey virtuous
and ways of relating to other pe~ple. "
.
Edmund L. Pincoffs points out, the virtues provide grounds
or for avoidance of persons," and shape the nuances of rel~
we tend to seek out friendly and kind people and to avmd
people, and our r~lationships. with tr~st~o.rthy individuals
from those with unrehable and dishonest mdiv1duals.
as ideals, virtues guide organizations, as ':ell as individual~Y
including philanthropic ones, can be sa1d to ac~, a~summg
which authorize individuals to act for the organ1zat1on as a
acts may or may not reflect patterns of ~o~ial responsi~ility,
compassion, prudence, efficiency, collegtaltty, and fidehty to
mission.
distinction: If the virtues include all desirable traits of indir<iinstltUltiOns, then we should differentiate between moral and non42 Moral virtues such as honesty, compassionateness, and
direct concern for the interests of others (in addition to
Other categories of virtue include aesthetic excellence (graceful' intellectual excellence (intelligence, creativity, commitment to
physical excellence (vigor, athletic skill), and religious sensitivity
the sacred). In what follows, "virtue" will refer to moral virtues,
the context indicates otherwise.
this distinction, we should appreciate that nonmoral viron moral significance in certain circumstances. As will become
next chapter, the nonmoral virtues of reverence for the sacred,
of beauty, and commitment to excellence in the professions all
significance when they motivate morally desirable forms of phiM<)re~ovc::r, just as moral and nontnoral virtues interact in philando moral and nonmoral purposes. Even when a philanthropic
moral per se, giving may have moral significance. Giving to
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the arts, humanities, and sciences has dear moral implications b h.
.
·
h
·
, Ot
fi ttng artists, umantsts, and scientists and in promoting the
everyone affected by their achievements.

Caring within Communities
Between 194-0 and 194-4-, the 3,500 French villagers at Le
cued 6,ooo Jews, most of them children, by sheltering them from
and smuggling many to Switzerland. They took enormous risks.
they gained the indulgence of a sympathetic Nazi officer, the
could have been massacred if even one citizen betrayed their
did.
T~e community at Le Chambon was unified by ties of religion
phy, history, and local traditions. Most villagers were descendants of
~uenots, a Protestant minority persecuted in Catholic France
sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The community was also united
of benevolence, courage, perseverence, and integrity. As Philip
their "caring had to do in part with Saint John's commandment to
another, but it also had to do with stubbornness, if you will,
refusal to abjure . . . [their] commitment'' to sheltering people
they shared through empathy and with compassion. 43
Many of the villagers did not regard their actions as heroic or
ceptionally virtuous. In their eyes they were simply responding to
of others: "How can you call us 'good'? We were doing what had to
Who else could help them? And what has all this to do with
Things had to be done, that's all, and we happened to be there to
You must understand that it was the most natural thing in the
these people.'~ Whether or not they were religious, members of
mu?ity acknowledged a sense of responsibility to help strangers
their hves. But the felt responsibility was not experienced as an
den. It was a spontaneous and natural response to need, and as
adigm of virtue.
. Andre Trocme was the local pastor who led the villagers'
ststance to the Nazis. During the years before the war, Trocme
lated an ethic of service centered on a distinction between giving
merely giving things. Hallie explains:
[W]hen you give somebody a thing without giving yourself, you
both parties by making the receiver utterly passive and by making
a benefactor standing there to receive thanks-and even so1metm1es
ence-as repayment. But when you give yourself, nobody is
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are elevated by a shared joy. What you give creates new,
instead of arrogance on the one hand and passivity on the

between giving oneself and merely giving things is not
-~""'"m"" ••., volunteering time and donating money; the villagers

in both ways. Instead, it is the distinction between giving
impersonally. However good its consequences, imper'lralteilS relationships based on moral equality. By contrast, givgood will and good judgment-enables us to bring our
relationships based on a sense of shared humanity.
at Chambon expressed existing ties of community and also
..:•.M.nntnr by creating new caring relationships. A pre-existing
•.w.n n1ru became focused in doing something of moral conseExisting community organizations were transformed in orfleeing for their lives, as well as to protect the villagers.
for example, together with some thirteen Bible study
tralns:torme:d into a communications network which enabled the
respond quickly to Nazi raids.
.........,lUlU''-'"' illustrates, philanthropic caring within communities
relationships that strengthen, enlarge, and partly define corny what is meant by "caring'' and "community''?
can refer to several things: an attitude, the specific virtue of
a more generic virtue of moral concern manifested in all the
" ............, ....... , .. u· •..,u based on mutual moral concern. After briefly distinI will rely on context to indicate which is meant.
caring is positive regard for the good of someone or
care "about'' persons (or animals) is to desire their well-being
rather than solely for benefits to us. To care "for'' individuals
their well-being or to be prepared to. Their well-being
reason to act on their behalf, without having to look further
to us.
:,.;n:amoonna:'ts remind us, caring is a sympathetic response to the
It implies understanding their situation, desires, and beliefs.
a· readiness to help if needed. It is shown in a variety of emocompassion, solicitude, fear for people who are in danger,
are in trouble, hope for success in their endeavors, delight
..,n,.,.....
joy when they return our love, and remorse when we
needed help. And it is shown in beneficent acts that is acts
the desire to help and which actually succeed i~ helpin~ oth..-l
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Caring, then, is more than conduct, even though conduct
decisive indicator. Caring involves sensitivity, understanding,
good judgment-aspects of character that are not reducible to
ple rules of Do and Do Not. All aspects of the personality are
connecting our lives with others. That is why giving with
oneself.
As the specific virtue of benevolence, caring is the virtue of
the attitude of caring in morally desirable ways. It implies
needs and desires of others, showing compassion for their
lighting in their good fortune, being kind and generous. In a
form, it is a general attitude of active good will toward &&-·•U«lu
focused form, it is directed toward particular individuals or
As a generic virtue, caring is moral concern for persons
This is the thematic sense used in the title of this book and
present chapter. Beyond just wishing others well, it is a at·s:positio1
when one can, together with a tendency to help effectively.
means giving in a concerned and careful manner, with good will
ligence. As such, it is an umbrella virtue which alludes to the full
of philanthropic virtues explored in Chapter 2.
Caring relationships are between two or more people who
generic sense) for each other. Caring is not always reciprocated with
parity. Parents caring for their newborn baby constitute one
caring relationship, even though of necessity it is an unequal
Normally, however, the caring person hopes that the caring will
be reciprocated, even when the hope is not fulfilled: regrettably, a
turns a cold eye toward a benefactor; tragically, an infant dies
return its parents' love.
Can philanthropy involve caring relationships? Isn't it more a
helping strangers based on one-way positive attitudes, by contrast
and friendships where talk of relationships is straightforward?
To begin with, much philanthropy is connected with family,
other face-to-face interactions. Much philanthropy is engaged in
family member, living or dead, or offered on behalf of an
Moreover, many philanthropic interactions in local communities
extension of family relationships; for example, participating in
Teachers Association, church groups, and amateur sports. In
ways, philanthropy provides ways to express in a public forum
relationships rooted in private life.
In addition, philanthropy creates new personal relationships.
hand, there are new friendships to be made with people we help.
Anena, who for years has served meals to homeless people at a
park near my college, makes a point of seeking friendship with
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· g 1·n a Big Brother or Big Sister program, volunarents and siblings. On the other hand, volunteers
of ~ammon causes tend to develop ties of friendship.
inspiration) to hundreds of students who over the years

tn servm

to help with her w~rk.
.
.
h direct interactions are not posstble, prospects for mw en
diminish. That may create problems. The increasure of large organizations and mass movements in
c
nat
. d
is a cause for genuine concern.
Umte Way, tor
Where
e1se
,
.
.
.
.r~snOJtlctc:o by allowing donors to spe~tfy ~hiCh_ prog~ams their
thereby strengthening personal tdenttficanon wtth causes.
when we do not know beneficiaries or other contributors,
our lives in caring ways with others. Why do we conpolitical party or social ca_use? B~cause. we share its
other individuals, givers and receivers al1ke, With whom we
'buting to our country, state, or city, we sustain ties to
about even though we do not know them personally.
givi;g to strangers with whom ~e have no particul~r .affiliaa caring relationship when we ma1l a check to help VICtims of
or tornado? There is a relationship of shared humanity
that our efforts will be appreciated, and in that sense our
In giving, we connect our lives with theirs in ways
affirm human kinship. A gift shows they matter to us. Our
for strangers is limited, but it exists and it is important. It
·vated, and one way is through philanthropy.
to strangers have an intimacy all their own. Donations of
with symbolic meaning. 48 So do gifts of body organs. At the
scope of these gifts-their range of possible recipients-is
donor does not know who will receive the blood, or even
be sold or discarded before it can be used. Even when the
however, there is a symbolic relationship: donors hope their
and they naturally hope the gift will be appreciated; they also
· with people in need of life-saving resources.
organs, and emergency funds have strong symbolic meanbecause they are offered to strangers. They express our desire
because they are people, rather than because they stand in
relationship to us. This meaning is not sentimental fluff; it is
the gifts in which it is embedded.
· caring is not always aimed directly at persons. The immemay be an ideal, cause, practice, organization, animals, or the
There is still concern for the well-being of what we care about,
of well-being differs according to the object. The well-being
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of persons is self-fulfillment. The well-being of animals is their
in the life appropriate to them. The well-being of a community
stitution, or practice is its continuance and improvement. And th~
of ideals means their widespread acceptance and implementation.
Even in these cases, caring relationships with persons are often
involved. To care for a cause or an organization typically implies
people affected by them. A gift to a hospital or a medical research
is more than impersonal support to promote scientific knnur••"'ri"·~
expression of concern for people who will benefit from those
In addition, there are the relationships among individuals who
mitment to practices and institutions. Commitments to music or
preservation, for example, link people together in shared endeavors
tual care. There are also relationships, however formal, with people
resent organizations and groups. Even an acknowledgment
representative of an organization to which we mailed a donation
mum form of reciprocity, which explains why its absence nr,.,.....,,..... ;:.
ment.
Turn now to the idea of community, which is a value-laden
community is any group of people joined by shared caring, both
caring in which they care about the well-being of members of the
confluent caring in which they participate together in practices on
of caring for the same activities, goals, or ideals. 49 For example,
communities are identified by confluent commitments to relllgtcms 14
well as by reciprocal caring among church members. Professional
ties unite people with shared goals and also evoke reciprocal
colleagues. Neighborhood communities combine shared interests
terest in neighborhood safety and beauty) with mutual concern
being of the members. Many philanthropic organizations are
communities which serve wider communities. Widest of all is
community'' that includes all morally concerned humans, past,
future. Next in scope is the "global community'' comprising all
ently alive. Then come societies and the smaller communities they
.,,,...",<~
intimate small groups (families, a circle of friends), more ·
scale structures (such as governments), and a variety of u·1te1~mc!dl~tt<
serving special needs. Philanthropic organizations generally tur1ct1on
mediate or "mediating groups" which link individuals and families
social structures. 50
Communities, including philanthropic ones, provide a variety of
for fostering virtues. Churches, scouts, amateur athletics, eduGILtlon~
ties, and service organizations are examples of groups that help in
virtues and promoting caring relationships which sustain coJDfl1l1fllt1~
viously not all communities are equally effective in this regard,
all are good overall. 51 Fully desirable communities-the ones in
r ..............

c. 11 developed in individuals and organizationssuccesslu Y

communities generate extensive networks of recipTypically, individuals have _some awareness t~at
·
canng. This makes it rational to g1ve to strangers w1th
· w ·u be reciprocated even when we are unable to
carmg 1
it is.
c. · 1
· able communities are just, in that they do not un1a1r y
des1r
·
b h.
set eligibility requirements that restnct mem ers tp,
may cannot be based on preJudice.
· · They recogntze
· all peo-

tesirau.l'-'

r~i·g·~~hts to participate in and benefit from th~ ~alider s<:>ci~ty
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unity is embedded. With respect to po ttlc soctettes,
economic inequalities unless the minimal needs of all

t'dc:!su~able community is characterized by widespread appreciation

. That means valuing its practices, institutions, traditions,
It implies cherishing the communi_t~'~ ~eritage, hopi?g for
desiring to promote its present poss1b1httes. These att1tudes
·
but they must be widespread.
desirable communities there are numerous valuable activities
lestrallle ones. The activities may be political, economic, profeslnn::u--or philanthropic, as in giving together. Cooperation, tol':a'wa1reness of the importance of that cooperation, is essential.
is widespread faith and trust in the prospects for the comevoke full participation of community members. Without
of social cooperation are at risk. 53 In particular, without trust
philanthropic giving loses its hope and its point. At the same
~'I>hiJlanthropl·c giving is value-centered and virtue-guided, it is a
for strengthening social trust. 54
is extensive rational public discourse and shared reflection
and activities of a group. Moral discourse and reasoning are
Philanthropic organizations improve their chances of
the public good insofar as they maintain open dialogue with
· and the public. Insofar as they contribute to public dismoral issues, they strengthen the conceptual framework essential
caring within communities. A vocabulary of the virtues is a
that framework.
,,.......... . . . . . . . . .,. . has eroded in American society, in the view of Robert
co-authors of the sociology-based study Habits of the Heart.
was borrowed from a phrase used by Alexis de Tocqueville
mental and moral dispositions which unify a society. One such
heart, observed by Tocqueville during his famous visit to the
in 1831, is the tendency to form and participate in voluntary
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organizations. According to Tocqueville, this tendency counterbalances the
danger of excessive individualism in isolating people from the wider community. According to Bellah, this danger threatens the very community which
makes individual freedom possible.
Bellah occasionally portrays Americans as behaving selfishly: "We have
put our own good, as individuals, as groups, as a nation, ahead of the common good. " 55 His main thesis, however, is that Americans suffer from a kind
of conceptual selfishness: "If there are vast numbers of a selfish, narcissistic
'me generation' in America, we did not find them, but we certainly did find
that the language of individualism, the primary American language of selfunderstanding, limits the ways in which people think."56 During their study
of some two hundred individuals, Bellah and his colleagues repeatedly heard
descriptions of family, work, and community involvement cast in self-centered terms. Americans' primary language in thinking about values is the
language of personal success through material rewards ("utilitarian individualism"), together with personal pleasures through satisfying preferences ("expressive individualism"). Even in portraying their moral commitments, they
emphasized individual choices rather than responsibility. Their conceptual
world centers in "lifestyle enclaves" of private consumption rather than in
public community.
Bellah urges us to rethink individualism. Its valuable aspects, especially
personal initiative, self-reliance, and respect for individual dignity and freedom, should be retained. Personal initiative, however, needs to be understood
as exercised in and through community. That understanding can be fostered
by returning to two traditions deeply embedded in American culture. One
is the republican tradition of active democratic citizenship. The other is the
biblical tradition which has kept alive the ideal of a compassionate and just
society. Reclaiming the moral languages of these two traditions will enable
us to reconceive individualism as a product of communities and in turn be
fulfilled by giving back to communities.
I have some sympathy for Bellah's recommendations (even though the
moral language he proposes is not altogether dear). At the same time, given
our increasingly pluralistic culture, it would be parochial to recommend a
biblical emphasis to the neglect of Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist scriptures
and the rich literature of nonsectarian humanism. If we are to communicate
across religious boundaries, as well as reconcile individualism and community, we need to emphasize what is common or at least overlapping among
our moral languages, and do so within a pluralistic world view which is
tolerant of alternative religious and moral perspectives. A first step in that
direction is to become more fully acquainted with the language of the virtues.

2
Virtues in Giving
Actions expressing virtue are noble, and aim at what is noble. Hence the
generous person ... will aim at what is noble in ?is giving and will giv~
correctly; for he will give to the right people, the nght amounts, at the nght
time, and all the other things that are implied by correct giving. He will do
this, moreover, with pleasure or [at any rate] without pain ....
-Aristotle
[V]irtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the
world as it really is.
-Iris Murdoch

the virtues as tendencies to hit the mean, that
is, the reasonable middle ground between the vices of too much (excess)
and too little (deficiency). He classified the virtues according to the kinds of
emotions, desires, and actions they govern. Thus, courage is the mean between cowardice and foolhardiness when confronting danger and experiencing fear; temperance is the mean between overindulgence and apathy in
satisfying the appetites; pride is the mean between vanity and a sense of
inferiority when making self-appraisals or feeling self-esteem. According to
Aristotle, there are two virtues in giving wealth, depending on one's economic resources. Eleutheriotes, sometimes translated as "liberality," is the virtue of openhanded givers who have modest resources. Megaloprepeia,
translated as "magnificence," is the corresponding virtue of wealthy individuals who are able to make lavish gifts. For liberality the extremes are wastefulness and stinginess, whereas for magnificence the extremes are vainglory and
pettiness.
Liberality and magnificence are usually understood as two dimensions of
the virtue of generosity. Yet the word "generosity'' is not a perfect translation
of Aristotle's terms. In its ordinary sense, "generosity'' means benevolent giving beyond what is required or customary. By contrast, Aristotle had in mind
the far more robust idea of correct giving, whether on modest or on lavish
scales. He meant voluntary giving to worthy recipients, in fitting amounts,
on suitable occasions, for apt reasons, with appropriate attitudes and emo-
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